Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 110-130 nuclear warheads, although it could have more. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, deploying additional nuclear weapons, and new types of delivery vehicles. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, but Islamabad's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called "full spectrum deterrence" have led some observers to express concern about an increased risk of nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India, which also continues to expand its nuclear arsenal.
Summary
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 110-130 nuclear warheads, although it could have more. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, deploying additional nuclear weapons, and new types of delivery vehicles. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, but Islamabad's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called "full spectrum deterrence" have led some observers to express concern about an increased risk of nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India, which also continues to expand its nuclear arsenal.
Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Pakistani and U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A. Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs, have improved Pakistan's nuclear security.
However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of the Pakistani government or diversion of material or technology by personnel within Pakistan's nuclear complex. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. Furthermore, continued Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons development could jeopardize strategic stability between the two countries. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
Background
Chronic political instability in Pakistan and Islamabad's military efforts against the Taliban and al-Qaeda have raised concerns about the security of the country's nuclear weapons. Some observers fear that Pakistan's strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists or used by elements in the Pakistani government. However, U.S. officials have generally expressed confidence in the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.
The collapse or near-collapse of the Pakistani government is probably the most likely scenario in which militants or terrorists could acquire Pakistani nuclear weapons. Gary Samore, thenNational Security Council Coordinator for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, stated in an April 2011 interview that
The Pakistani government takes the nuclear security threat very seriously, and they've put a lot of resources into trying to make sure that their nuclear facilities and materials and weapons are well secured. There's no lack of recognition that this is a very important issue, and there's no lack of incentive on the part of the Pakistani government to maintain control. What I worry about is that, in the context of broader tensions and problems within Pakistani society and polity-and that's obviously taking place as we look at the sectarian violence and tensions between the government and the military and so forth-I worry that, in that broader context, even the best nuclear security measures might break down. You're dealing with a country that is under tremendous stress internally and externally, and that's what makes me worry. They have good programs in place; the question is whether those good programs work in the context where these broader tensions and conflicts are present. 1 Pakistani efforts to improve the security of its nuclear weapons have been ongoing and have included some cooperation with the United States; former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf told a journalist in 2009 that Islamabad has "given State Department nonproliferation experts insight into the command and control of the Pakistani arsenal and its on-site safety and security procedures." 2 Moreover, following the 2004 revelations of an extensive international nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan, as well as possible connections between Pakistani nuclear scientists and Al Qaeda, Islamabad has made additional efforts to improve export controls and monitor nuclear personnel. The main security challenges for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal are keeping the integrity of the command structure, ensuring physical security, and preventing illicit proliferation from insiders.
Some observers are also concerned about the risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan. The two countries most recently came to the brink of full-scale war in 1999 and 2002, and, realizing the dangers, have developed some risk reduction measures to prevent accidental nuclear war. Nevertheless, Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons and appears to be augmenting its weapons production facilities as well as deploying additional delivery vehiclessteps that will enable both quantitative and qualitative improvements in Islamabad's nuclear arsenal. Some observers have argued that Pakistan's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called "full spectrum deterrence" indicate "the growing nuclearization of Pakistan's national security policy." These developments have "sparked international concerns about the safety and security" of the country's nuclear weapons, as well as raised "concerns that these weapons might be used through intentional, inadvertent, or accidental launch in a crisis or in limited warfare with India." 3
Nuclear Weapons Program 4
A 2013 State Department report explains that India and Pakistan's governments view nuclear weapons as "vital to their security," adding that these states' respective decisions to pursue nuclear weapons stem largely from their troubled bilateral relationship, assessments of threats posed by each other (and China in India's case), perceptions of enhanced national power or status derived from possession of such weapons, and domestic politics. The nuclear programs are popular within each country and are protected by strong institutional and domestic political constituencies. In view of these factors, international pressure over a period of decades has had little direct impact on the attitudes of India and Pakistan concerning nuclear weapons. 5 Islamabad is expanding its nuclear arsenal and developing of new types of nuclear weapons. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Olson told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on December 16, 2015, that the United States is "concerned" about "the pace and the scope of the Pakistan's missile program, including its pursuit of nuclear systems."
6 The administration also worries that "a conventional conflict in Southwest Asia could escalate to include nuclear use as well as the increased security challenges that accompany growing stockpiles," he added.
Background
Pakistan's nuclear energy program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in a war with India that probably triggered a January 1972 political decision (just one month later) to begin a secret nuclear weapons program. 7 Observers point to India's 1974 "peaceful" nuclear explosion as the pivotal moment that gave additional urgency to the program. 8 During the 1970s, Pakistan began programs to produce highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium for use as fissile material for nuclear weapons. HEU and plutonium are the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. Pakistan first produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope.
3 Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, A Normal Nuclear Pakistan, Stimson Center and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015. 4 Pakistan has signed neither the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty nor the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. However, UN Security Council Resolution 1172, which was adopted in 1998 after India and Pakistan's nuclear tests earlier that year, called upon those countries to "stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Islamabad gained technology for its nuclear weapons program from many sources. This extensive assistance included uranium enrichment technology from Europe and China. 9 Islamabad has received Chinese and European assistance for at least some of its plutonium program. A 2001 Defense Department report states that "China supplied Pakistan with nuclear material and expertise and has provided critical assistance in the production of Pakistan's nuclear facilities."
10 This assistance included help during the 1990s with a "plutonium production reactor" and ring magnets from a Chinese entity for Pakistan's enrichment program.
11 China may also have provided "nuclear weapons design information" to Pakistan. 12 In addition, China and North Korea have supplied missiles to Pakistan. One 2013 non-governmental report argues that Pakistan has been procuring components for its enrichment program from foreign entities.
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Uranium Enrichment Program
The U.S. and other governments had information during the 1970s that Pakistan was constructing a uranium enrichment facility. 14 produce only low-enriched uranium (which is not used as fissile material in nuclear weapons), but a 1986 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) memorandum indicates that Islamabad had violated the pledge and added that Pakistan had "overcome the last major obstacle to nuclear weapons by producing enough high enriched uranium for one or more nuclear devices." 18 Pakistan's "HEU production capacity" in 1987 was "sufficient to produce one bomb per year," according to an ACDA memorandum written the next year. 19 The country's main enrichment facility is a centrifuge plant located at Kahuta; 20 Pakistan may have other enrichment sites.
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Plutonium Program
A 1985 CIA report described a possible Pakistani plan to "build a plutonium production reactor" 22 and Pakistan has operated the 40-50 megawatt heavy-water Khushab plutonium production reactor since 1998. 23 Islamabad has been constructing at least three additional heavy-water reactors, which would expand considerably Pakistan's plutonium production capacity, at the same site; all four reactors at the site are operational, according to reports from nongovernmental experts. 24 Additionally, Pakistan has a reprocessing plant 25 at the New Laboratories facility of the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) and is apparently constructing other such plants. 26 Sources identify 2000 and 2002 as the dates when the PINSTECH plant began operating. 27 Pakistan also appears to be constructing a second reprocessing plant at PINSTECH 28 and may be completing a reprocessing plant located at Chasma.
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Nuclear Weapons Development
The United States had information during the 1970s and early 1980s that Pakistan was pursuing nuclear weapons designs, but exactly when Pakistan produced a workable nuclear explosive device is unclear. 30 According to a 1978 State Department cable, the United States estimated that it would take Pakistan "at least" three to five years to produce a nuclear explosive device. 31 A 1982 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessed that Pakistani nuclear testing would be" feasible for the first time" in late 1983 or 1984.
32 A 1985 National Intelligence Council report states that Pakistan "probably [had] a workable design for a nuclear explosive device" and was "probably ... a year or two away from a capacity to produce enough" highly enriched uranium for such a device. 33 According to a 1991 NIE, Pakistan had "a viable nuclear weapons design and has components that it could assemble into nuclear devices on short notice."
34 Islamabad attained such a capability "by the end of the 1980s," said a 1993 report to Congress, apparently from the National Security Council. In any case, President Bush's failure to certify in 1990 that Pakistan did not "possess a nuclear explosive device" led to a cut-off in military and financial aid under the Pressler Amendment. 40 After India conducted nuclear weapon tests on May 11 and May 13, 1998, Pakistan's government responded on May 28 and May 30 with six tests in western Pakistan. Test yields were about 10 kilotons and 5 kilotons, according to seismic analysis. 41 The United States imposed additional sanctions after the tests, but these were lifted after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States.
Nuclear Arsenal
According to public estimates, Pakistan has about 110-130 nuclear weapons, although it could have more. 42 According to one unofficial estimate, Pakistan has produced approximately 3,000 kilograms of weapons-grade HEU and approximately 200 kilograms of plutonium for nuclear weapons. 43 Islamabad continues to produce both HEU and plutonium for nuclear weapons and is developing and deploying a variety of weapons. A 2014 press report, citing Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, a scientist closely involved with the country's nuclear weapons program, states that "Pakistan has over 15 types of nuclear weapons, from large weapons that can be carried on fighter jets to small ones that can be loaded onto ballistic missiles, and even smaller warheads for cruise missiles and tactical nuclear weapons." 44 Pakistan's HEU-based nuclear warheads use an implosion design with a solid core of approximately 15-20 kilograms of HEU. 45 Pakistan has also produced plutonium-based warheads, 46 which likely contain approximately 4-6 kilograms of plutonium, according to one expert estimate. 47 Pakistan has reportedly addressed issues of survivability through pursuing a second strike capability, possibly building hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities, deploying road-mobile missiles, deploying air defenses around strategic sites, and utilizing concealment measures.
Delivery Systems
Pakistan has "aircraft and land-based missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons," according to a 2013 State Department report. 48 Pakistan has two types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons: aircraft controlled by the Pakistan Air Force and surface-to-surface missiles controlled by the Pakistan Army.
Aircraft
According to former SPD official Khan, Pakistan in 1995 "had a nuclear device deliverable by fighter aircraft." 49 Islamabad could modify F-16 fighter aircraft purchased from the United States to deliver nuclear weapons; it is widely believed that Pakistan has made the relevant modifications to its U.S.-supplied F-16s. 50 The contract for provision of an additional 18 aircraft was signed in 2006, as was the contract for the weapons for those aircraft and a contract to perform the mid-life upgrade on Pakistan's F-16A/B model aircraft. 51 The U.S. government maintains that the sale of additional F-16s to Pakistan will not alter the regional balance of power. 52 Pakistan will, therefore, expand its F-16 fleet but the planned nuclear-capable portion of the fleet is unclear. Mirage V aircraft may also be used as delivery vehicles. kilometers; 58 and the liquid-fuel Hatf-V (Ghauri), with a range of 1,250 kilometers. 59 According to a 2013 National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) report, the solid-fuel Hatf-VI (Shaheen-2), with a range of 2,000 kilometers, "probably will soon be deployed." 60 Pakistan has also tested a version of the Shaheen-1 missile, called the Shaheen-1A, with a range of 900 kilometers. 61 Additionally, Islamabad has announced flight tests of a nuclear-capable ballistic missile, called the Shaheen-3, with a range of 2,750 kilometers. 62 This missile, according to Lieutenant General (Retired) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, former Director General of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, is designed to reach Indian islands so that India cannot use them as "strategic bases" to establish a "second strike capability." 63 Pakistan has also announced successful tests of the Hatf-II (Abdali), a short-range ballistic missile with a range of 180 kilometers 64 which NASIC characterizes as " [d] evelopmental." The missile "carries nuclear as well as conventional warheads," according to a February 2013 government statement. 65 In addition, Pakistan has also tested its short-range NASR ballistic missile (see below). Pakistan is developing nuclear-capable cruise missiles: the Babur (ground-launched) and the Ra'ad (air-launched), both of which will have estimated ranges of 350 kilometers. 66 An April 29, 2011, Pakistani government announcement gave the Ra'ad's range as 350 kilometers; 67 a May 31, 2012, flight test announcement gave the range as "over 350" kilometers. 68 An October 28, 2011, Pakistani government announcement gave the Babur's range as 700 kilometers.
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Sea-Based Nuclear Weapons
A Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson reacted to India's July 26, 2009, launch of its first indigenously built nuclear-powered submarine by asserting that "continued induction of new lethal weapon systems by India is detrimental to regional peace and stability," adding that "[w]ithout entering into an arms race with India, Pakistan will take all appropriate steps to safeguard its security and maintain strategic balance in South Asia." India is developing "submarine-launched ballistic missiles," according to Admiral Haney. 70 In May 2012, Admiral Mohammad Asif Sandila, then-Chief of Pakistan's Naval Staff, announced "the formal establishment of the Naval Strategic Force Command of Pakistan," describing the force as "the custodian of the nation's 2 nd strike capability." 71 General Kidwai indicated during a March 2015 conference that the submarine program is "a work in progress," adding that "this capability will come into play in the next few years." 72
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
Pakistan is developing what the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency described in February 2015 as "close-range 'battlefield' nuclear weapons to augment its existing ballistic missiles."
73 Kidwai explained that Pakistan has "opted to develop a variety of short range, low yield nuclear weapons, also dubbed tactical nuclear weapons." 74 For example, Pakistan conducted in April 2011 the first successful flight test of the solid-fuel Hatf IX (NASR), a road-mobile missile with a range of 60 kilometers 75 which "carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy" 76 and "has been specially designed to defeat all known Anti Tactical Missile Defence Systems."
77 Some observers have expressed concern that non-strategic nuclear weapons could increase the risk of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. (See "Nuclear Doctrine" section).
Nuclear Doctrine
The United Kingdom's Foreign and Commonwealth Office has argued that "Pakistan's strategic posture, including nuclear, is clearly framed around its perception of the threat from India." 78 Similarly, then-DIA Director Burgess told the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 10, 2011, that the "persistent India-Pakistan rivalry drives Islamabad to develop its nuclear infrastructure, expand nuclear weapon stockpiles ... and seek more advanced nuclear warheads and delivery systems, including cruise missiles." 79 Pakistan has repeatedly described its strategic doctrine as "credible minimum deterrence." 80 In 2004, a Pakistani official described four policy objectives for Islamabad's nuclear weapons: deter all forms of external aggression; deter through a combination of conventional and strategic forces; deter counterforce strategies by securing strategic assets and threatening nuclear retaliation; and stabilize strategic deterrence in South Asia. 82 Pakistani officials have also indicated that this nuclear posture is designed to preserve territorial integrity against Indian attack, prevent military escalation, and counter India's conventional superiority.
83 Air Commodore Khalid Banuri, Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs in Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, explained in December 2011 Islamabad's nuclear arsenal is part of an effort "to deny India the space for launching any kind of aggression against Pakistan." 84 More recently, Islamabad's "nuclear deterrence capability is aimed at maintaining regional stability in South Asia," according to a September 3, 2013 statement from Pakistan's Foreign Ministry spokesperson. Pakistani Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry explained in October 2015 that the country's "nuclear programme is one dimensional: stopping Indian aggression before it happens. It is not for starting a war. It is for deterrence." 85 Despite Islamabad's stated wish to avoid a nuclear arms race with New Delhi, 86 Pakistan appears to be increasing its fissile production capability and improving its delivery vehicles in order to hedge against possible increases in India's nuclear arsenal and also to deter Indian conventional military action. Indeed, aspects of the credible minimum deterrence doctrine have always been ambiguous and the concept appears to have changed over time. A 2013 State Department report explains that Islamabad has not "publicly articulated clear requirements or quantified what stockpile of nuclear weapons and fissile material would be sufficient to achieve" its credible minimum deterrence posture. 87 Pakistani officials have argued that a variety of nuclear arsenals could satisfy credible minimum deterrence; Air Commodore Banuri asserted in December 2011 that Pakistan's "deterrence requirement remains dynamic" and a precise number of nuclear weapons to satisfy this requirement "cannot be quantified." 88 He also argued that "India's massive conventional military build up, the India-U.S. nuclear deal," and India's pursuit of missile defense systems, forced Pakistan "to make qualitative and quantitative adjustments" to its nuclear arsenal. 89 Banuri also cited Indian military doctrines that Islamabad describes as prescribing rapid conventional military action against Pakistan. Describing the evolution of Pakistan's deterrent, General Kidwai explained that the nuclear program "started with a concept of credible minimum deterrence," but Islamabad "translated it ... to the concept of full spectrum deterrence."
90 Kidwai added that Pakistan developed this doctrine in response to possible Indian rapid conventional military attacks, arguing that some Indian officials were "toying with the idea of finding space for conventional war," because Pakistan lacked non-strategic nuclear weapons and New Delhi did not believe that Islamabad would retaliate with its other nuclear weapons.
Pakistani officials have argued that non-strategic nuclear weapons can increase the credibility of its nuclear deterrent versus Indian conventional military operations. General Kidwai argued that "by introducing the variety of tactical nuclear weapons in Pakistan's inventory, and in the strategic stability debate, we have blocked the avenues for serious military operations by the other side."
91 In 2011, Kidwai described the first test of the NASR missile as "a very important milestone in consolidating Pakistan's strategic deterrence capability at all levels of the threat spectrum."
92 Some observers have expressed concern that such weapons could increase the risk of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan for at least two reasons. First, Pakistani military commanders could lose the ability to prevent the use of such weapons, which would be more portable and mobile than Islamabad's current nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Second, Pakistani forces may launch non-strategic nuclear weapons in order to counter possible Indian preemptive attacks on those weapons' launch platforms.
93
Pakistani officials have previously argued that the ambiguity concerning Islamabad's no-first-use policy serves to maintain deterrence against India's conventional superiority; a Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated May 21, 2009 , that "there are acquisitions of sophisticated weaponry by our neighbour which will disturb the conventional balance between our two countries and hence, lower the nuclear threshold." Other analysts argue that keeping the first-use option against New Delhi allows Islamabad to conduct operations, such as support for low intensity conflict or proxy war in Kashmir, while effectively deterring India at the strategic level. 94 In any case, Pakistani statements suggest that the government has a high threshold for using nuclear weapons. According to a 2012 State Department report, Pakistan previously has said that "nuclear use would be a 'last resort' under circumstances that are 'unthinkable. '" 95 Nevertheless, Pakistani officials have said for some time that the government may need to increase significantly its nuclear arsenal in response to possible Indian plans to do the same. According to an April 2006 television broadcast, Pakistani officials from the government's National Command Authority (NCA) expressed "concern" that the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement could tilt the strategic balance between India and Pakistan in favor of the former. The officials suggested that Islamabad may need to increase or improve its nuclear arsenal in order to "to meet all requirements of minimum credible defence deterrence." 96 Similarly, according to the January 2010 statement, the NCA identified "developments detrimental to the objectives of strategic stability in the region," including India's acquisition of "advanced weapons systems" and missile defense systems. The NCA also noted that the 2008 decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to exempt India from some of its export guidelines, as well as subsequent nuclear fuel supply agreements that New Delhi has concluded with several governments, "would enable India to produce substantial quantities of fissile material for nuclear weapons by freeing up its domestic resources." The statement suggests that Pakistan could increase or improve its nuclear weapons in response to these developments, but does not explicitly say so. Shahzad Chaudhry, a retired Pakistani Air Vice Marshall, argued during a July 18, 2011, U.S. Institute of Peace event that India's stockpile of reactor-grade plutonium is an additional concern for Pakistan.
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India has stated that it needs only a "credible minimum deterrent," but New Delhi has never defined what it means by such a deterrent and has refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Furthermore, both the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement and associated NSG decision renewed New Delhi's access to the international uranium market. This access has apparently resulted in more indigenous Indian uranium available for weapons because it will not be consumed by India's newly safeguarded reactors. 98 Pakistani officials have offered estimates for the number of additional nuclear weapons that New Delhi could build. For example, Wajid Shamsul Hasan, Pakistan's High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, argued in an October 2010 letter to a British newspaper that eight Indian nuclear reactors that will not be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards have the potential to produce 280 nuclear weapons annually.
99 India currently has approximately 110-120 nuclear weapons, according to one public estimate.
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Whether and to what extent Pakistan intends to continue increasing its nuclear arsenal is unclear. General Kidwai asserted in 2015 that the country's nuclear weapons program "is not open ended" and indicated that Islamabad will not increase the number of weapons significantly during the next 10-15 years.
101 "There's no need" for Pakistan to develop longer-range missiles than it currently possesses, he added. Current and former Pakistani officials have also argued that the country has achieved its goal of deterring Indian conventional attacks. "War is no more an option," Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry stated in October 2015. 102 Despite its increasing nuclear arsenal, a 2015 Pakistani non-paper states that Islamabad "shall not be the first to resume nuclear testing."
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Command and Control
Pakistan's command and control over its nuclear weapons is compartmentalized and includes strict operational security. The government's command and control system is based on "C4I2SR" (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance). Islamabad's Strategic Command Organization has a three-tiered structure, consisting of the National Command Authority (NCA), the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the Strategic Forces Commands.
General Kidwai asserted in 2015 that the NCA and SPD have "operational control" over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, explaining that "only day-to-day administrative control, some kind of technical control" has been delegated to the country's armed services. 104 The NCA, established in 2000 and codified in the National Command Authority Act, 2010, supervises the functions and administration of all of Pakistan's organizations involved in nuclear weapons research, development, and employment, as well as the military services that operate the strategic forces. The prime minister, as head of government, is chairperson of the NCA. 105 The NCA also includes the chair of the joint chiefs of staff; the ministers of defense, interior, foreign affairs, and finance; the director general of the SPD; and the commanders of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The final authority to launch a nuclear strike requires consensus within the NCA; the chairperson must cast the final vote. The NCA is comprised of two committees, the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee (DCC), each of which includes a mix of civilian and military officials. The ECC's functions include establishing a command and control system over the use of nuclear weapons. The DCC "exercises technical, financial and administrative control over all strategic organisations, including national laboratories and research and development organisations associated with the development and modernisation of nuclear weapons." 106 The NCA also has a "fully automated Strategic Command and Control Support System, " which "enables robust Command and Control capability of all strategic assets with round the clock situational awareness in a digitized network centric environment to decision makers."
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The SPD is headed by a director general from the Army and acts as the secretariat for the NCA. The SPD's functions include formulating Islamabad's nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine; developing the nuclear chain of command; and formulating operational plans at the service level for the movement, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons. The Army, Air Force, and Navy each have their own strategic force command, but operational planning and control remains with the NCA. The SPD coordinates operational plans with the strategic forces commands. According to current and former Pakistani officials, Islamabad employs a system which requires that at least two, and perhaps three, people authenticate launch codes for nuclear weapons.
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The National Command Authority Act, 2010, addresses the problems of the proliferation of nuclear expertise and personnel reliability. It outlines punishable offenses related to breach of confidentiality or leakage of "secured information," gives the SPD authority to investigate suspicious conduct, states that punishment for these offenses can be up to 25 years imprisonment, and applies to both serving and retired personnel, including military personnel, notwithstanding any other laws.
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
Pakistani officials cite their concern about India's recently-acquired ability to expand its nuclear arsenal as a reason for refusing to support negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which operates by consensus, on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). 109 Such a treaty would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The CD adopted a program of work Pakistan, which is widely regarded as the main opponent to the start of negotiations, 114 argues that a treaty on fissile material should not only prohibit the production of new material, but should also require states with such material to reduce their stocks. 115 A treaty without such a requirement, according to Pakistan, will put the country at a disadvantage with respect to India because of what Islamabad characterizes as New Delhi's larger fissile material stocks and production capability. 116 Although the Shannon Mandate states that it "does not preclude any delegation" from proposing the inclusion of existing stocks in the negotiations, Islamabad argues that the CD ought to determine the treaty's scope prior to beginning negotiations.
117
Nuclear Weapons Security
According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, Islamabad's nuclear weapons "are probably stored in component form,"
118 which suggests that the nuclear warheads are stored separately from delivery vehicles. According to some reports, the fissile cores of the weapons are separated from the non-nuclear explosives. 119 According to Dr. Mubarakmand, the scientist closely involved with the country's nuclear weapons program, Pakistani nuclear weapons are "stored in three to four different parts at three to four different locations," adding that, "[i]f a nuclear weapon doesn't need to be launched, then it is never available in assembled form."
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The 2001 Defense Department report says that Pakistan can probably assemble its weapons fairly quickly. 121 It warrants mention that, although separate storage may provide a layer of protection against accidental launch or prevent theft of an assembled weapon, it may be easier for unauthorized people to remove a weapon's fissile material core if it is not assembled. Dispersal of the assets may also create more potential access points for acquisition and may increase the risk of diversion. In the fall of 2007 and early 2008, some observers expressed concern about the security of the country's arsenal if political instability were to persist. 127 Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said in a November 5, 2007, interview that, although then-President Musharraf claimed to be in firm control of the nuclear arsenal, she feared this control could weaken due to instability in the country. 128 Similarly, Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center has argued that "a prolonged period of turbulence and infighting among the country's President, Prime Minister, and Army Chief" could jeopardize the army's unity of command, which "is essential for nuclear security." 129 U.S. military officials also expressed concern about the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. 130 Experts also worry that while nuclear weapons are currently under firm control, with warheads disassembled, technology could be sold off by insiders during a worsened crisis.
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen described U.S. concern about the matter during a September 22, 2008, speech: To the best of my ability to understand it-and that is with some ability-the weapons there are secure. And that even in the change of government, the controls of those weapons haven't changed. That said, they are their weapons. They're not my weapons.
And there are limits to what I know. Certainly at a worst-case scenario with respect to Pakistan, I worry a great deal about those weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and either being proliferated or potentially used. And so, control of those, stability, stable control of those weapons is a key concern. And I think certainly the Pakistani leadership that I've spoken with on both the military and civilian side understand that. we continue to have confidence that the government of Pakistan is well aware of the range of potential threats to its nuclear arsenal, and we continue to be confident that Pakistan has a professional and dedicated security force that understands the importance and the high priority that the world places on nuclear security. Other governments have also voiced opinions regarding the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. For example, Indian National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan said that the arsenal is safe and has adequate checks and balances. 136 Similarly, then-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Miliband told the Charlie Rose Show on December 15, 2008, that Islamabad's nuclear weapons "are under pretty close lock and key." Furthermore, according to Director of the French General Directorate of External Security Erard Corbin de Mangoux, Pakistan's military and civilian leaders have a "sense of responsibility" to maintain control over the country's nuclear weapons; these leaders "know that the international status to which they aspire depends directly on their ability to exercise complete control over such an instrument of power," he argued in an interview published in spring 2010.
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Other non-U.S. officials, however, have sounded somewhat less optimistic. For example, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said in a March 24, 2009, television interview that Moscow is "very much concerned" about the security of Pakistan's arsenal. 138 Indian officials expressed concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal following the May 2011 insurgent attack on the Karachi military installation. Pakistani officials have consistently expressed confidence in the security of the country's nuclear arsenal. 140 Then-President Musharraf stated in November 2007 that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are under "total custodial controls." 141 According to Pakistan's 2014 Nuclear Security Summit statement, the country's "nuclear security regime is anchored in the principle of multi-layered defense for the entire spectrum of any nuclear threat" and includes a "specially trained Special Response Force," an "integrated intelligence system" and "[f]orce validation exercises." 142 The SPD "has two separate divisions to oversee security and intelligence, with more than 25,000 personnel between them," according to SPD official Adil Sultan.
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The May 2011 U.S. strike that killed Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden generated a public discussion in Pakistan as to whether a country such as India or the United States could successfully attack and destroy Pakistan's nuclear weapons. 144 Responding to these concerns, then-Prime Minster Gilani stated May 25, 2011, that the country's "strategic assets are well protected and our capability to defend our sovereignty, territorial integrity and liberties of our people, is very much in place." 145 In addition to the above scenarios, the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons could also be jeopardized by another conflict between India and Pakistan, Michael Krepon argued, explaining that an "escalating war with nuclear forces in the field would increase the probability of accidents, miscalculations, and the use of nuclear weapons" because [w] hen tensions rise precipitously with India, the readiness level of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent also rises. Because the geographical coordinates of Pakistan's main nuclear weapon storage sites, missile, and air bases can be readily identified from satellites-and therefore targeted by opposing forces-the dictates of deterrence mandate some movement of launchers and weapons from fixed locations during crises. Nuclear weapons on the move are inherently less secure than nuclear weapons at heavily-guarded storage sites. Weapons and launchers in motion are also more susceptible to "insider" threats and accidents. 146 Such a war, Krepon added, would also place stress on the army's unity of command. Krepon has also pointed out that Islamabad faces a dilemma, because less-dispersed nuclear weapons may be more vulnerable to a disarming military strike from India. 148 On November 12, 2007, responding to press reports about this contingency, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson said, "Pakistan possesses adequate retaliatory capacity to defend its strategic assets and sovereignty," emphasizing that Islamabad's nuclear weapons have been under "strong multilayered, institutionalized decision-making, organizational, administrative and command and control structures since 1998." 149 The issue of U.S. contingency plans to take over Pakistani strategic assets was raised again in the press following Benazir Bhutto's assassination, and was met with similar assurances by Pakistan's government.
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Responding to a report detailing alleged U.S.-Pakistani discussions regarding contingency plans for U.S. forces to help secure Islamabad's nuclear weapons, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson stated on November 8, 2009, that Pakistan "does not require any foreign assistance in this regard." Pakistan will never "allow any country to have direct or indirect access to its nuclear and strategic facilities," the spokesperson said, adding that "no talks have ever taken place on the issue of the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal with US officials." 151 ThenSecretary of Defense Gates stated in January 2010 that the United States has "no intention or desire to take over any of Pakistan's nuclear weapons."
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The United States reportedly offered nuclear security assistance to Pakistan soon after September 11, 2001.
153 U.S. assistance to Islamabad, which must comply with nonproliferation guidelines, has reportedly included the sharing of best practices and technical measures to prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of storage facilities and personnel reliability. 154 As noted above, Islamabad employs a system requiring that at least two, and perhaps three, people authenticate launch codes for nuclear weapons. 155 Security at nuclear sites in Islamabad is the responsibility of a 10,000-member security force, commanded by a two-star general. Former Pakistani military officials have said Pakistan has developed Permissive Action Links (PALs) for its warheads without U.S. assistance. 156 PALs require a code to be entered before a weapon can be detonated. The extent to which Pakistan has shared information about its nuclear arsenal with the United States is unclear. Although, as noted, former President Musharraf has acknowledged that Islamabad has shared some information, General Tariq Majid, then-chair of Pakistan's Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, stated November 9, 2009, that "there is absolutely no question of sharing or allowing any foreign individual, entity or a state, any access to sensitive information about our nuclear assets."
160 Air Commodore Banuri indicated in a 2008 interview that Islamabad accepts U.S. "education and awareness, but in a completely non-intrusive way," adding that Pakistan has "some rudimentary equipment and some training" from the United States. Banuri described U.S. access to Pakistan's nuclear weapons facilities as a "red line" that Islamabad will not cross. 161 The U.S. government has also reportedly offered assistance to secure or destroy radioactive materials that could be used to make a radioactive dispersal device, and to ship highly enriched uranium used in the Pakistani civilian nuclear sector out of the country. 162 Pakistan's response to these proposals is unclear, and downturns in the bilateral relationship overall may have complicated efforts to make progress in this area.
It is worth noting that, according to some observers, spent fuel from Pakistan's Karachi and Chasma nuclear power plants could be vulnerable to theft or attack. 163 However, Pakistani officials have expressed confidence in the security of its facilities 164 has no plans to transport spent fuel from either reactor. Moreover, the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) has a Nuclear Security Action Plan, which includes a description of regulations for handling spent nuclear fuel. The PNRA states that Pakistan follows IAEA physical protection standards.
Proliferation
A fundamental aspect of nuclear security is ensuring that personnel with sensitive knowledge do not transfer that expertise. Although Pakistan has made significant reforms in this area, many observers continue to be concerned that other states or terrorist organizations could obtain material or expertise related to nuclear weapons from elements in Pakistan. Qaeda on biological weapons and rudimentary nuclear weapons technology came to light. 181 The Pakistani government did not press criminal charges against Mahmood and Majeed, but put the scientists under house arrest in 2002. This extreme case raised awareness of the "insider threat" and subsequently led to changes in Pakistani personnel security policy, detailed below. Accounts raise the possibility of other groups or individuals also providing al Qaeda or other groups with nuclear expertise, but less information is publicly available.
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Pakistan's Response to the Proliferation Threat
Then-Under Secretary Burns testified in July 2007 that the Bush Administration has "told the Pakistani government that it is its responsibility ... to make sure" that neither the Khan network nor a "similar organization" resurfaces in the country. Since the revelations about the network, Pakistan appears to have increased its efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. Ambassador Olson argued during a December 16, 2015, House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing that Pakistan has "made considerable progress" in its nonproliferation efforts. It is worth noting that, because Khan conducted his proliferation activities as a government official, they do not necessarily indicate a failure of Islamabad's export controls.
Pakistani officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. 183 For example, Islamabad adopted in September 2004 new national export controls legislation which includes a requirement that the government issue control lists for "goods, technologies, material, and equipment which may contribute to designing, development, stockpiling, [and] use" of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems. According to a February 2008 presentation by the Director of Pakistan's Strategic Export Controls Division (SECDIV), 184 the lists, which were issued in October 2005, include items controlled by multilateral export control regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. 185 The government issued revised control lists in 2011 and 2015. 186 According to a 2013 State Department report, the 2011 revisions contained "gaps" which must be closed before the lists are "fully harmonized with the multilateral [export control regimes." 187 Whether the 2015 revisions addressed these gaps is unclear.
The export controls legislation also includes a catch-all clause, which requires exporters to notify the government if they are aware or suspect that goods or technology are intended by the end-user for use in nuclear or biological weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons. 188 The legislation includes several other important elements, such as end-use and end-user certification requirements and new penalties for violators. Since its adoption, Pakistan has established the SECDIV and an associated Oversight Board. The SECDIV is responsible for formulating rules and regulations for implementing the legislation. The board is comprised of officials from multiple agencies and is headed by Pakistan's Foreign Secretary.
Issues for Congress
Legislation to authorize various forms of U.S. assistance to Pakistan contains provisions related to Islamabad's nuclear weapons program. S. 1707, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, which became law (P.L. 111-73) on October 15, 2009, authorizes various forms of U.S. assistance to Pakistan, including strengthening democratic institutions and law enforcement, as well as supporting economic development, education, human rights, and heath care. P.L. 111-73 requires the President to certify that Pakistan is "continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks." It also requires a Semi-Annual Monitoring Report that is to include a detailed description of Pakistan's nuclear non-proliferation efforts and an assessment of whether assistance has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan's financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program.
In response to concerns expressed in Pakistan over the intent of the bill, a "Joint Explanatory Statement" was submitted for the Congressional Record by then-Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry and then-House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman. The statement emphasizes that "the legislation does not seek in any way to compromise Pakistan's sovereignty, impinge on Pakistan's national security interests, or micromanage any aspect of Pakistani military or civilian operations." Regarding reporting requirements on nuclear nonproliferation cooperation, the statement says:
The many requirements of this report are intended as a way for Congress to assess how effectively U.S. funds are being spent, shortfalls in U.S. resources that hinder the use of such funds, and steps the Government of Pakistan has taken to advance our mutual interests in countering extremism and nuclear proliferation and strengthening democratic institutions.
There is no intent to, and nothing in this Act in any way suggests that there should be, any U.S. role in micromanaging internal Pakistani affairs, including the promotion of Pakistani military officers or the internal operations of the Pakistani military. 203 
